

## Police Corruption in Kazakhstan: The Preliminary Results of the Study

Bakhyt Nurgaliyev<sup>1</sup>, Kuatzhana Ualiyeva<sup>1</sup> & Branislav Simonovich<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Karaganda “Bolashak” University, Karaganda, Kazakhstan

<sup>2</sup> Faculty of Law, University of Kragujevac, Kragujevac, Serbia

Correspondence: Bakhyt Nurgaliyev, Karaganda “Bolashak” University, Erubaev street 16, Karaganda, 100012, Kazakhstan. Tel: 7-701-533-7521. E-mail: nbake@mail.ru

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### Abstract

This article presents the results of studies on the preventive and operational measures used to combat the police corruption in Kazakhstan on the background of the similar measures used by the police in the CIS and western countries. It analyzes the frequency and evaluation of the applied anti-corruption measures and efficiency of fighting corruption in the Kazakh police in accordance to the international reports.

**Keywords:** corruption in Kazakhstan, police corruption, the fight against corruption, anti-corruption measures

### 1. Introduction

In recent years, the issue of corruption is in the focus of society as a whole, as well as politicians, scientists and law enforcers. Today this is a serious international problem requiring a joint international approach and certain global anti-corruption instruments. Challenges issued by corruption, “undermine democratic institutions, ethical values and justice, inflict damage to the sustainable development and the rule of law” (UN General Assembly resolution, A/RES/62/202). At the present stage of socio-economic development of Kazakhstan, fighting corruption is one of the most important strategic goals of economic and political development of the country.

In Kazakhstan, the anti-corruption fight is a long time battle, which in many respects, in our opinion, is the legacy of the Soviet era. However, objectively speaking, the significant results have been achieved only at the household level and the activity in combating the elite level corruption has increased, but the systemic corruption continues to flourish (Bogdanov, 2012).

It is generally accepted that corruption is a universal phenomenon, that has the greatest scope in developing countries or countries with economies in transition, and it may seem that this phenomenon is primarily associated with poverty (Rubinsky, 2010). Kazakhstan is not an exception. Among 102 countries surveyed by the international ten-point index of the business representatives’ corruption perception, it is ranked at 25th place from the end with 6.3 points. One of the few Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, has acquired its independence in 1991, and in the transition period adopted the new features of a corrupt state with a large share of the shadow economy. Kazakhstan remains mostly producing country with a high level of corruption, which prevents the development of small and medium-sized businesses, contributes to the plundering of natural resources, and to the investments unprofitable for the national economy. Kazakhstan’s rating in the Transparency International (TI) annual reports varies at the lowest positions. Currently, with 2.8 points, Kazakhstan is ranked as 133 out of 176 countries with a relatively low ranking among the countries in Central Asia, but better than any of them. TI experts say that corruption is particularly prevalent in the judiciary, police, customs, land registration, licensing and construction (Investment Climate Statement–Kazakhstan, 2013).

Bribe has firmly established in the vault of the contemporary life unspoken rules. Society no longer condemns it. The ability to use it meets approval, admiration and even envy of others. Corruption has become the business of the state and at international level, whose turnover exceeds oil revenues and profits of drug traffickers. At last count, 30 to 50 percent of the population’s income is spent on bribes, and their volume is greater than the size of the state budget. Virtually “the corruption itself created our modern society, rallied and tied with mutual responsibility of the government officials, politicians, public figures, oligarchs and ordinary businessmen, left the whole “uluses” at their mercy and sustenance, became the basis of their worldview, ideology and the goal of life”—claim journalists

(Tauzhanov, 2007), whose opinion is partly agreeable.

Global practice shows that during the transition period a state is under high corruption risk. Corruption does not recognize national borders. And Kazakhstan as a country with vast natural resources and a relatively short period of independence, is subject to various manifestations of corruption. Successful fight against corruption, as economists argue, provides immediate benefits, which are many times higher than the related expenses. Studies conducted by the World Bank Institute, register that the countries fighting corruption and ensuring the proper rule of law, can quadruple the national income in the long term (Information analytical materials of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, 2006).

Nowadays, the problem of corruption is one of the issues of concern for not only Kazakhstan, but for most countries of the world. It is pervasive, including law enforcement. Police corruption leads to the growth and strengthening of organized crime and increased social tensions.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the Financial Police Agency, the National Security Committee (NSC), the Agency for Civil Service Affairs of RK are responsible for the fight against corruption, although the issues of jurisdiction and competition between the financial police and NSC in operational support and investigation of the police corruption offenses have been observed recently.

In Kazakhstan, the police is a component of the law enforcement agencies; it is subdivided into the criminal police—as part of The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the military police (in the Ministry of Defence) and the financial police (Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting economic and corruption crimes). The society perceives the modern police as a specific professional organization, using the powers of the state in providing services to citizens to ensure their personal safety and public order. At the same time, corruption-factors that may affect the deterioration of its image should be excluded from its multifaceted activities.

The police of the sovereign Kazakhstan generally meets the requirements of the international instruments and laws of the republic. The public confidence must be the most important in its activities, which is hard to win, but easy to lose. International studies show that the loss of public confidence in the police is more damaging to the police activity and that many believe the police structure to be an irreplaceable institution of public order and security (Thomassen, 2013).

Unfortunately, in the recent years, Kazakh society regularly faces the scandals associated with the police. Among them are the cases of senior law enforcement officials—Baimagambetov, former Minister of Internal Affairs, who was convicted in 2012 for corruption; Khorgos case of corruption in the customs; Karaganda financial authorities convicted of large bribes; torture of detainees in police stations; numerous bribe takers from the road patrol (formerly SAI), drunken policemen in expensive cars and other “werewolves in epaulets”. At the same time, the flow of such news does not stop. Thanks to the Internet and social networks, such news immediately become known to the public and set up citizens against the police. This means that the quality problem of our police force and the nature of its interaction with society is not only concern of the high-ranking politicians and police officials, but also every citizen.

According to a series of surveys conducted in the period 2004-2012 by the Levada Center only 25-30% of citizens trust the police in one form or another, more than 80% note lawlessness from its side, over 70% do not consider themselves protected from arbitrary police actions, about 60% say about degradation of the system that cannot be hidden. In addition, an important fact has been revealed—at least a third of Kazakhstan citizens have once bribed police officials. Therefore, on a 5-point scale, ordinary citizens estimate the work of police with 3.9 points. Another important figure—66% of the households perceive the police in the country as strongly affected or extremely corrupt (Kazakhstan “fell” in the corruption ranking, 2013). In addition, more than half of respondents said that they had at least once bribed the police officers in 2012. According to the Global Corruption Barometer Transparency International in 2013—54% of respondents reported paying bribes to the police in the past year (Global Corruption barometer, 2013). In very difficult conditions, on a 7-point scale, working businessmen assess the reliability of police services in Kazakhstan with 3.9 points. According to the World Economic Forum, foreign companies operating in Kazakhstan, reported frequent oppression by Kazakh police with unannounced inspections, checks and other methods of and sometimes intimidation of foreign investors, causing them to refuse to cooperate with the government (Investment Climate Statement—Kazakhstan, 2013).

All these figures give the impression that, according to national surveys and reports of international organizations, Kazakhstan police is one of the most corrupt public institutions and citizens believe the police to be the most corrupt organization in Kazakhstan, whose efforts are now increasingly focused on providing its own interests (Peculiarities of the Kazakhstan corruption, 2012).

From 4150 complaints sent to the blog of the Minister of the Internal Affairs in 2011, 329 were about police corruption and abuse of position. Statistics show the opposite—only a few hundred of criminal cases a year against corrupt police officers and dozens of all cases brought to court. The above figures have been stable for the last eight years; they have not changed after a series of police reforms and indicate that the police itself are the problem.

Global Integrity 2010 reports that Kazakhstan law enforcement agencies are not protected from biased intervention into personnel policy. Appointments in the Kazakhstan police are often based on non-professional criteria and party loyalties, as well as personal relationships. In addition, law enforcement officers, especially high ranking, escape prosecutions. In accordance with the U.S. State Department report in 2012, 61 law enforcement officers and 78 police officers were fired from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on corruption charges in 2011 alone.

A direct appeal of the country's police on extortions for appointments to higher positions was sent to the President, duplicated into the Security Council, the National Security Committee and the General Prosecutor's Office. Thus, the price of the position of the police department chief in South Kazakhstan is 30 to 100 thousand dollars. Moreover, in the future the applicants are obliged to pay 10 thousand dollars a month (Mirzahodzhaeva, 2007). Incidentally, a similar pattern worked in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where positions in the police are bought and sold. Thus, the position of the regional police chief can cost up to 50,000 U.S. dollars, a good position in the car inspection costs \$ 100 to \$ 500, the rank of lieutenant and above 3000 dollars. Such payments can be quickly recovered, as the police themselves then extort money from drivers and citizens (Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, 2002).

An extraordinary assessment in 2011-2012 did not improve the police significantly. In spite of the fact that one in five of over 110 thousand police officers assessed, has not passed the testing, the police crimes, including corruption-related, still occur in the country (Musin, 2012).

Despite the systemic nature of the law enforcement corruption, no research of this phenomenon has been conducted in Kazakhstan for over 20 years of independence. Law enforcement authorities, the MIA of RK in particular, limited themselves to individual facts at the board and operational meetings, without regard to scientific understanding of this important issue. Separate dissertations and articles do not affect the prevention and awareness of all scales of police corruption.

To be fair, some innovative ideas of the Minister of the Internal Affairs (2003-2005), Zautbek Turisbekov who introduced the rotation of the police chiefs, and evaluation of knowledge of laws and duties during the police assessment should be noted. Under his command the MIA internal security service was also reformed, its vertical, in which it established regional and city departments. Among the main problems were identified: the protection of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens and legal entities; prevention, detection, suppression, investigation of crimes and offenses committed by police officers; control over compliance with professional ethics.

Previously, most Kazakhs did not trust the police. At a meeting the Minister announced the following figures: 18% of respondents admitted that they do not trust the police, 15% of the statements were not recorded at all, while 60% of respondents reported that police tried to persuade them not to write applications at all (Akhmetzhanov, 2004).

Integration of the road and patrol police, the transfer of certain functions and structures to the Ministry of Justice, and to the public health authorities were some of the innovations of the Ministers who followed. However, no thorough scientific basis for such decisions was provided, so they were taken randomly without proper scientific assessment, and analysis.

In other words, the whole anti-corruption activities of the police department command do not rely on science, despite the fact that three police academies operate in the Ministry—Almaty, Karaganda and Kostanay as well as Aktobe Law Institute with research departments and even private research institute.

## **2. Methods and Data**

Numerous comparative studies in the field of the anti-corruption fighting are gaining increasing importance in criminology and, particularly, in research on police investigations, given that globalization brings increased knowledge transfer between countries. Bearing this in mind, it should be noted that Western science is largely advanced in the study of police corruption. We are just making small steps to study the corrupt police reality.

Given the fact that for a long time Kazakhstan has been a part of the Soviet Union, the structure and activities of law enforcement agencies extremely coincides with the structure and activities of law enforcement agencies of almost all republics received sovereignty from the Soviet Union. Hence, the legal framework, the legal regulation of the police organizations of these countries is very similar. Therefore, given this similarity, we, in our study relied on statistics, examples of judicial practice and analysis of the sociological and legal literature on the issue of

police corruption of both Western countries and countries of the former Soviet Union.

In this study, we designate only separate fragments concerning the police corruption in Kazakhstan. Previously was conducted our joint comprehensive comparative study of the police corruption of three countries—Austria, Kazakhstan and Serbia, the progress report was published in Budapest in August 2013. It is in the editing and printing process (Simonovic, Edelbacher, & Nurgaliyev, 2013). Therefore, the fragments of the study are interpreted in relation to Kazakhstan only, as it differs significantly in terms of political and economic development, democratic traditions, police structure, anti-corruption policy of Serbia and Austria.

Kazakhstan is an Asian country in transition which occupies 133rd position in the global world index (CPI-2014—rating—28) (Global Peace Index, 2014). Kazakhstan police, as noted above, is going through a difficult period of democratization, depoliticization and professionalization, which makes the development of fighting corruption in this department very important.

The questionnaire covered the reactive and proactive measures, most frequently recommended in the literature and reports of international organizations, on the police corruption studies, and other documents (e.g. on investigation and court corruption) (Anti-corruption Investigation and Trial Guide, 2005; Benchmarking Police Integrity Programmes, 2013; Mollen Commission Report, 1994). In addition to standard measures, the questionnaire contains questions to determine the respondents' opinion on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and future needs in the various anti-corruption models. The original version of the questionnaire was made in English language. For the purpose of an interview with the Kazakhstan police, the questionnaires were translated into Russian.

The general part of the questionnaire included questions on age, length of service, education, rank, position in the police. The special part of the questionnaire contained questions about the dependent variables related to reactive and preventive measures applied in the fight against police corruption. Respondents were asked to express their opinions on which specific measures to combat corruption (or some similar action) are applied in the Kazakhstan police system and to what extent. Our goal was to determine the awareness of respondents on the application of specific reactive and proactive measures in the field of prevention and fighting corruption in the Kazakhstan police. In the second part of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of each measure in the fight against police corruption.

In addition, we aimed to determine the opinion on the measures to combat corruption in the police of those who apply these anti-corruption measures.

Interviews with Kazakhstan police officers were conducted in February-April 2013 so that each respondent was familiar with the purpose of research and the value of individual variables. Structured interviews were conducted in Kazakhstan with a total of 50 police officers interviewed. Preference was given to more experienced police officers (with 12.4 years of work experience) with higher education. Interviewed police officers represented mostly various criminal police units and the general jurisdiction police officers. The interviews results were processed in the statistical program SPSS.

In the present study, a hypothesis was formulated as follows: “The attitude of the police in Kazakhstan to the effectiveness and frequency of specific measures applied in the fight against corruption in the police have significance for the formation of anti-corruption strategy in the police of Kazakhstan”.

### 3. Research Results

We were interested, first of all, in the respondents' assessment of the frequency of reactive and proactive measures to combat police corruption in their countries, especially Kazakhstan, as well as the issue of the repressive criminal measures. The scale of possible answers ranged from: “Not applied nor is planned to be introduced” = 1 to “It is used regularly” = 5. In particular, only 66% of interviewed police officers from Kazakhstan answered that the measure mandatory suspension against corrupt police officers is implemented regularly and 20% of respondents choose answer occasionally (M = 4.45). Similar responses were received for the question about repressive measures: initiation of disciplinary action, filing criminal charges, providing evidence related to the offense of any officer (regardless the rank or position) if there is reasonable suspicion of committing an act of corruption. Only 50% of the respondents from Kazakhstan stated that this measure is applied regularly and 26% occasionally (M = 4.41). Undoubtedly, the attitudes of police officers that these two repressive measures are applied irregularly in the police of Kazakhstan is a weak point in the fight against corruption in the country's police.

The survey found that special investigative techniques are actively applied against corrupt police officials, such as a bribe provocation, the use of undercover agents, wiretaps, covert surveillance of premises and vehicles (M =

3.90). From the responses of the interviewed police officers, it became clear that wiretapping and recording of telephone conversations is the most common techniques ( $M = 4.25$ ).

Polygraph test of the police officers suspected of corruption is less heavily used in the anti-police corrupt practices. The answers led to the conclusion that this measure is rarely used in Kazakhstan (average  $M = 2.23$ ). Using internal informants to gather information about corrupt policemen in Kazakhstan amounted to  $M = 4.25$ .

A testing is practiced in the fight against police corruption as well, (Targeted integrity testing), it has been used in Kazakhstan with a frequency ( $M = 3.45$ ), with 18% of respondents stating that it is used regularly, 20% said it is used sometimes. Random integrity testing is applied in Kazakhstan to a certain degree ( $M = 3.29$ ; used regularly 12%, used occasionally 22%, not informed 44% and not applied 22%).

Polygraph testing as a control, screening measure is rarely applied in Kazakhstan ( $M = 1.93$ ).

Psychological and ethical testing in police is used to identify people who are prone to corruption, as well as to abuse of other laws. The responses indicate that these measures are used to a certain extent ( $M = 3.56$ ).

Those asked are also aware of such technique as hidden AV fixing of corrupt criminal activity which applies in Kazakhstan with a frequency  $M = 3.88$ .

Certain percentage of respondents (which is not insignificant) did not answer the question on the application and the frequency of individual anti-corruption measures. They chose the answer, marked in the table as (3) "I am not informed in this regard". The most common reason why they could not answer the question of whether a particular measure in the fight against police corruption in Kazakhstan would be applied was the fact that they cannot give a precise answer regarding its implementation.

Results of the survey of police officers in Kazakhstan on evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the fight against the police corruption differ from the responses of police officers from the other two countries in the fact that the answers to the questions have not reflected significant deviations, as well as high scores in the responses. All responses were an average value of about 3 or below. With regard to these answers, you can build several hypotheses and test them in future research. But it seems that respondents from Kazakhstan do not believe in the potential of these anti-corruption measures and the possibility of successful control of the police corruption and the state of corruption in society in general.

#### **4. Discussion**

Statistical information on crime and the results of some criminological research suggests that the corruption phenomenon has grown deep roots in the system of police. Police officers increasingly establish informal corrupt ties not only with ordinary citizens, but also with persons engaged in illegal business activities, as well as criminals, and sometimes with the organized criminal structures. It should be noted that corruption in the police system is not episodic, but mass and large scale (Tirskikh, 2006). Moreover, high-ranking police officials are involved in police corruption, who either organize massive corruption themselves or condone subordinates taking bribes. Public danger of police corruption lies in the fact that these acts are committed by officials, who are primarily in responsibility to enforce the law. The high level of corruption crime not only increases the total number of crimes committed in the country, but also entails a reduction in the authority of law enforcement and the entire state apparatus in the country's population, generates a feeling of distrust in the citizens, and unwillingness to seek help in case of violation of their rights and interests (Varygin, 2003). Therefore, an acute problem of zero tolerance to corruption remains in the police.

Theoretically, it is indisputable that the prevention of corruption starts at the top with strong leadership (Punch, 2000). Effective leadership means zero tolerance for corruption in the police force, equal treatment for all police officers, regardless of posts and ranks. It does not mean the mandatory imposition of suspicion before the verification procedure for each police officer suspected of taking bribes.

Implementing a programme for improving integrity in the policy stands no chance of success, unless strategy of zero tolerance is applied in practice and corruptive behavior is unquestionably sanctioned. "Sanctions applied on a consistent basis form an important part of any integrity programme. Officers who commit integrity breaches and are allowed to remain in post or to resign without sanctions imposed upon them give contradictory messages to officer and staff as well as the public about the commitment of the service to countering corruption" (Benchmarking Police Integrity Programmes, 2013).

Corruption in the police influences reduction of confidence in the police (Kääriäinen, 2007). The quality of the business environment depends largely on relations with ordinary citizens, entrepreneurs, whether the police help them or, conversely, "put a spoke in the wheel" (Kravtsova, 2012). Virtually all professionals involved in the field

of police corruption in the CIS countries and abroad support this theoretical position (Anufrieva, 2010; Kolontaevskiy, 2010). Respondents from Kazakhstan indicated that only 2.6% of the population in the analyzed sample condemned the corrupt police. From the study, it can be concluded that the reason why people do not condemn police corruption, is lack of confidence that the authorities are ready to take adequate measures to protect this kind of behavior (Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 2012).

In judicial practice of Kazakhstan there is no stiffness against the police corruption, as part of the strategy of intolerance to corruption. In addition, the latency of police corruption offenses ranges from 50 to 95%, and the proportion of convicted with the maximum sentence is low. Such estimates are based on interviews with former law enforcement officers who are serving sentences in penal colonies (Tirskikh, 2006). The example of South Korea is indicative in this respect, where zero tolerance is strictly applied in practice, and results in automatic dismissal of the officers noticed in bribing of even one dollar. So, a Korean police officer was fired and arrested for a bribe of just \$ 5” (Ivkovic & Kang, 2012).

International experience shows that an effective fight against police corruption involves intensive and energetic work of verifying all statements indicating corruption, collecting evidence and initiating procedures, both disciplinary and criminal against all suspects. Many mistakes and errors occur in the anti-corruption practice, indicating the inability of the competent structures to quickly check the facts of police corruption which leads to unproven suspects actions, lost evidence and, ultimately, finding the truth and prosecution of corrupt police. Thus, Newburn emphasizes that the literature on police corruption is full of facts about the failure of the competent authorities to investigate cases of police corruption properly (Newburn, 1999). Of course, exposing police bribe is particularly difficult due to numerous reasons: the police officers carefully plan their actions, taking advantage of official position; try to avoid the presence of witnesses in corruption; in advance or during the investigation intimidate or blackmail the victim of corruption (Zimring & Johnson, 2005).

Furthermore, the police are familiar with the operational and technical capabilities of the internal security, the difficulties and limitations in the process of gathering evidence, are well aware of the secret operations conducted on corruption. Russian legislation, for example, ensures a constitutional protection of the investigators, the so-called official immunity, which, of course, is used by the corrupt police officers (Suprun, 2014).

Researchers on the police corruption in Serbia note that the investigation does not always follow the principle of equality, often the cases against high-ranking police officials go down on the brakes, not accidentally 91.1% of the police respondents said that “no actions were taken against them” or suspicions of corruption have not been proven. This is evidenced by the statistics—only 1 of 10 denunciations of police corruption bring a positive result (Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 2012). Our study also confirms the arguments of Serbian scientists about “untouchability” of high-ranked police officials in Kazakhstan, who are subject to criminal proceedings more rarely than the ordinary police officers.

This indicates the inability or unwillingness of the police command in Kazakhstan as well as in other countries, to seriously address the issue of fighting corruption. Such actions as failures or mistakes in collecting evidence (in the case of explicit statements about the corruption of a person) can be considered as complicity in corruption, sabotage of security, or at best, as unacceptable incompetence. Fear of police chiefs of the personal responsibility in case of subordinates of their divisions implicated in corruption, is a typical problem not just in developing countries, such as Kazakhstan, it is the problem in the police of the Western countries, where convicted of corruption subordinates are also covered (Bogdanov, 2012).

As for the response to initial information about the police corruption, the actions and work on gathering evidence, respectively, should be fast and efficient. Here, classic institutional methods to identify and fight against corruption are insufficient. (Criminal Justice Commission, 2001). In practice, the following methods had positive results: The operational study of reports and official documents, interrogations of colleagues, encrypted interrogation of persons reporting corruption, other operational and investigative activities aimed at the specific process of collecting intelligence about the internal corruption structure and profile of a “corrupt policeman” (Moran, 2005). In the legal literature and practice of some countries, there are recommendations for investigations into police corruption, which uses the same techniques that apply to organized criminal groups: Attention focus; use of informants and undercover employees in the corrupt police officers environment to ensure the use of covert recording and wiretapping, as well as tactical combinations (Punch, 2000). In that respect, it is important to mention that most of the complaints of the citizens concern less serious cases of corruption. Relying on citizens’ complaints can be wrong, as the most serious cases of corruption are related to drugs and they are out of public sight. Major corruption acts in the police happen outside of the sight and knowledge of “soft” approaches, such as citizens’ perception and their complaints. For this reason Australian research concludes that effective proactive

measures should be applied (Criminal Justice Commission, 2001). Covert surveillance using modern high technology can overcome the problem of lack of witnesses or lack of secret recordings of conversations and actions that can be associated with corrupt police practices (Prenzler & Ronken, 2003).

As in many countries, in Kazakhstan covert investigative techniques aimed at gathering evidence are used against suspected corrupt police officers, such as provocation bribery, the use of undercover agents; secret recording and wiretapping; covert surveillance of premises and vehicles. Nevertheless, the police officers of Kazakhstan unexpectedly evaluated them as ineffective. Such a low assessment of the effectiveness of preventive measures, of course, requires further research on a larger sample. It must be kept in mind that the secret investigative techniques in the analyzed countries are used as evidence of corrupt acts since recently. The period of application of the measures and experience of the police is much less than in Western countries. On the other hand, in the recent past history of the Communist Kazakhstan there are fresh cases of mass use of secret police methods of investigation as operational measures against political opponents in the years of Stalinist repression. Perhaps that is why there is a certain alienation and distrust to secret investigative techniques among Kazakhstan police officers.

Application of integrity tests, as well as other covert investigation techniques applied in the treatment of suspects of police corruption, is highly rated in the literature that covers the problem of corruption in the police (Ivkovic & Kang, 2012; Moran, 2005; A Survey of Innovations in the Development and Maintenance of Ethical Standards by Australian Police Departments, 2003; Punch, 2000).

On the other hand, our research showed that police officers from Kazakhstan gave quite low marks to effectiveness of polygraph testing ( $M = 2.63$ ) and integrity testing ( $M = 2.26$ ) as measures targeted towards the suspects. Such response demands additional research for giving a quality explanation. There is a possibility that the reason can be found in the fact that theory of application of integrity tests has a negative connotation in this part of the world (Konov, 2011), however, polygraph testing is applied in this region (Yuri & Akentiev, 2004).

In certain countries, especially with Anglo-Saxon legal system, integrity tests are applied as control measures with a random sample of police (random testing) or with police officers on position with a higher risk of corruption that positions in routine police work (Newburn, 1999). Aim of this type of integrity tests is intimidation and deterrence, since tested subject cannot know whether it is an integrity test or a real offer for corruption scheme. Application of these measures on a random sample (random testing), i.e., for the purpose of control is disputable in theory and in practice, first of all, from the ethical aspect (Konov, 2011; Moran, 2005; Newburn, 1999; Police Integrity, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, securing and maintaining public confidence, 1999; Prenzler & Ronken, 2001).

Apart from that, polygraph testing of police officers ("screening testing") is applied as control proactive methods in the departments that work on suppressing drugs or in other sensitive departments in different parts of the world, but not much is written about this topic, for American experience: Crawford (2002), Kraphol (2002) and Lersch (2001). For screening polygraph testing in Russia: Police Integrity, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and securing and maintaining public confidence (1999). This method does not involve delusion or provocation.

There is no developed practice of application of these methods in the continental part of Europe; there are legal obstacles, as the law prohibits provocation and incitement of criminal acts by the police or state authorities.

In the countries analyzed in this study, active covert investigative techniques are not applied, or are applied with restrictions, such as in Kazakhstan.

This result can be interpreted as the attitude of the interviewed police officers that it is necessary to introduce new methods in the combating the police corruption.

With this in mind, the authors of this article believe that their study confirmed the hypothesis that the opinion of police officers on the frequency of implementation of activities and their effectiveness in the fight against the police corruption are of great importance for the formation of anti-corruption strategies.

## 5. Conclusions

The results of our research and expert opinion support the idea that without the implementation of the strategy of zero tolerance to corruption in the police, all anti-corruption programs and attempts to create and strengthen the integrity of the police profession is doomed to failure. The police agency and commanding staff should have the dominant responsibility for all corruptive activities of subordinate police officers.

We believe that the goal of the police department related to the quality of their own methods of detection and investigation of the police corruption offenses is important (Ivkovic & Shelley, 2005). We agree with Newburn, T. that internal accountability system and constant monitoring over the "early warning" system are not less important (Newburn, 1999). However, the biggest obstacle in these attempts is the inefficiency of the courts and judicial

system, which can be seen in developing countries, Kazakhstan among them.

Legal systems of all countries, especially developing countries, need to accept the idea that police officers, especially those associated with a high risk of corruption, may and should be subject to various studies and testing for integrity and transparency. Privilege of police and state officer definitely deserves it. Studies conducted in Kazakhstan police, as well as in other countries, confirm that the interviewed police officers accept this idea.

Finally, we should be aware that any programs and plans in the fight against corruption, including the police environment, do not give instant results. It is a hard work and it is a task for world's best lawyers and sociologists.

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