



Corruption and the Challenge of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: A Case of the Nigerian Armed Forces

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the extent to which corruption in the Nigerian armed forces has been able to undermine the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study relied on the qualitative content analysis of secondary sources of data, and the theory of structural functionalism was adopted as the tool of analysis for the study. A thrust through the evolution and acts of terror of Boko Haram in Nigeria revealed that poverty, inequality, and corruption precipitated the rise of the sect and that Abubakar Shekau adopted a more extremist doctrine and approach for the sect after the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Since then it has been mayhem for Nigeria; the sect accounting for over 20,000 deaths and the displacement of over 1.3 million people. The paper argued that corruption has eaten deep into the Nigerian armed forces and has undermined the fight against Boko Haram through the theft of defence appropriations, the purchase of substandard weaponry, the creation of fake defence contracts, and the unavailability of logistical supports for and desertion of soldiers on the frontline. The paper, therefore, recommends the adoption of

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genuine political will in the anti-graft war and the strengthening of existing anti-graft agencies, the diligent monitoring of defence contracts and the performance of offsets arrangements in defence contracts, the introduction of socio-economic empowerment programs to create employment for unemployed youths particularly in the Northeast, and the prompt provision of adequate military logistics and sophisticated arms and ammunition for the soldiers on the frontline.

Keywords: Corruption; Boko Haram; terrorism; Nigerian armed forces.

1. INTRODUCTION

The responsibility of any government remains that of pursuing and maintaining the security and wellbeing of its citizens and its territory against internal insurrections and external aggressions. However, since her independence from Britain on October 1st, 1960, the Nigerian state has been fraught with a plethora of political and socio-economic challenges as well as violent conflicts which have threatened the development, peace, and security of the nation. This stems largely from the overwhelming effects of corruption on the nation and its defence sector, and the nature of interactions among the various ethno-religious and regional groups in the country which pursue their objectives through different means (the use of arms inclusive). Of particular note here is the Islamic sect in Nigeria's Northeastern region, Boko Haram, whose deadly activities have posed dangers to the nation and its citizens by causing massive mortality and casualty rates, national disintegration, displacement of Northeastern denizens, destabilized and crippled political and economic activities, and heightened insecurity and fear, as well as negatively affecting the country's global image; Boko Haram operations helped earned Nigeria a place among the least safe countries of the world [1].

Corruption is inimical to development. As [2] noted, "To solve this pervasive phenomenon, corruption, attempts by different successive political leaderships at different times in the nation's history have been made" but it seems the phenomenon is either resistant to the existing anti-graft measures or the measures have been faultily drafted and/or implemented, accounting for why corruption has invaded and is violently eating up the Nigerian armed forces. The link between corruption and instability (in national defence) is rightly gaining increased attention as seen in the allegations against Nigerian senior officers who have been bribed to turn a blind eye to Boko Haram [3], or to short-change the military by providing substandard military materiel. In this vein, the poor state of security in Nigeria occasioned by the perpetration of crises and the

corrupt-handling or theft of military appropriations meant for procuring the necessary equipment to confront and suppress these crises spells systemic failures and frustrates the Nigerian military's efforts of attaining national security demands.

Nigeria has since been bedevilled by insecurity issues and its security apparatuses are vehemently challenged to curb the escalation of the menace; but finding corruption within the armed forces' framework to supposedly combat insurgency, only complexes the problem. Therefore, this study sought to examine corruption with a view to ascertaining the impact it has had on the fight against terrorism and the pursuit of national security; it looks at Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria which has resulted to violence, insecurity, and challenge to national integration; the study undertakes an assessment of the challenges corruption poses to the Nigerian military's fight against Boko Haram terrorism; and it identifies measures that can be implemented to win the war both against corruption in the Nigerian armed forces, and against the Boko Haram terrorism.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Corruption in the Nigerian armed forces has been a prime factor billowing the descent of the military's ability to combat the issue of insecurity in Nigeria. In fact, since the nation's move to democracy in 1999, it is alleged that the military has been neck-deep within the oceans of fraud, embezzlement of allocations, and poor leadership. The existence of corruption in the Nigerian military is a steep slippery slope into the abyss (of national insecurity and instability). This is conspicuous in the fact that from 2002 till date, violent crises of grave dimensions orchestrated by Boko Haram have engulfed Nigeria resulting in the death of over 20,000 people, the displacement of over 1.3 million people from homes in the Northeastern region of Nigeria, ethnic chauvinism, loss of businesses and property, public fear and intolerance and onslaught, pallid national integration, and the non-provision of state services like health,

education, and commerce. This issue of corruption in the Nigerian military causes it to be ill-equipped with the sophisticated modern weaponry, promotes the purchase of substandard military hardware, facilitates the non-payment of soldiers, disrupts the process of food, medical supplies, and transport vehicles from reaching the battleground, and spurs the desertion of officers on the frontline causing them to stay longer than the scheduled time for their tours. In fact, the kleptocratic capture of the Nigerian defence sector has seen over US\$15bn stolen, leaving the military without vital equipment and insufficiently trained [4]. Therefore, as [5] wrote, with inadequate or substandard arms, low morale, desertion, hunger, thirst, and low welfare packages, the military would be relatively ineffective in combating insurgents whose strong homicidal will is augmented by better morale, weaponry, and logistics. The extent of corruption in Nigeria's armed forces can be seen in the Nigerian 2015 Transparency International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, a study of corruption risk levels in the Nigerian defence establishment. The report showed that Nigeria was ranked in Band E – the group of countries with very high corruption risk levels in their national defence establishments.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Corruption

The concept, corruption, has no universally accepted definition. In fact, as [2] wrote, "corruption means so many different things to so many different people at different times and places." Corruption is derived from the Latin word 'corruptus', literally meaning 'to rot', 'to decompose', or 'to disintegrate'. In other words, corruption signifies the state of losing purity, integrity, virtue, or moral principles. Little wonder [6] saw corruption as the perversion of integrity of state of affairs through bribery, favour or moral depravity. It involves the injection of additional but improper transactions aimed at changing the normal course of events and altering judgments and positions of trust.

Duke and Agbaji [2] defined corruption (though from its financial dimension) as all forms of deviant or unethical behaviour, malfeasance and any illegal use of power in both the public and private domains, spanning from the giving and acceptance of monetary rewards, the concealment of funds and assets obtained

illegally, to other non-monetary benefits, for individualistic, family, group or national gains which alter the ethos that condition authoritative positions, procedures and legal systems of sanctions.

For [7] corruption is "the abuse of public office for private gains". Public office is abused for private gains when an official accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage or profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs; through patronage, and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state resources.

From the foregoing, while the meaning and forms of corruption are still in dispute in many respects, we believe certain universal generalizations can be discerned. These include:

- i. Corruption varies in origin and forms owing to the differences in human behaviours at different times and places;
- ii. Corruption is an unethical act which breaches established position(s) of trust and behavioural standards;
- iii. It is pervasive as it can be found in both the public and private spheres;
- iv. Its purpose is (almost always) for personal or group aggrandizement, at the expense of the larger society;
- v. Its benefits may not be limited to financial gratuities;
- vi. The act is considered criminal and punishable under the existing legal system; and
- vii. Corruption is a draw-back to development.

2.2 Boko Haram

Boko Haram is the name of one of the world's dreaded terrorist groups based in the Northeastern region of Nigeria. The name Boko Haram is a combination of two words, 'Boko' (Hausa word for 'book', or 'Western education'), and 'Haram' (Arabic for 'ungodly', forbidden', or 'sinful'). When put together Boko Haram literally means 'Western education is sinful' [8,9]. It is the popular name for the Islamic sect originally called "Jama'atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihah" which in Arabic translates as: "the Sunni Community committed to the propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" [10] aimed at, through the use of the most hostile acts of violence, the expulsion of all Christian communities and 'polluting' Western ideals and

cultures from Nigeria, and the creation of an Islamic Caliphate as a means of ending poverty, individualism, and greed which are seen as consequences of a political system enveloped in corruption. It is worth noting here that to show its allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram named itself "Wilayat Ghard Afriqiya (Islamic State West Africa Province) [5].

2.3 Terrorism

Terrorism is a term derived from the Latin word "terrere" which translate in English as 'to instill fear' [11]. [12] averred that terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated acts of violence employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reason. For [13], it is a form of unconventional warfare used to attempt to force political change by: convincing a government or population to agree to demand to avoid future harm or fear of harm, destabilizing an existing government, motivating a disgruntled population to join an uprising, escalating a conflict in the hope of changing the status quo, expressing a grievance or drawing attention to a neglected cause.

Terrorism is more aimed at placing the psychological state of fear in those who see or hear of the terror acts. Little wonder [14] defined terrorism as the use of threat of violence that is limited in its physical destructiveness but high in psychological impact because it creates fear and shock. Furthermore, in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of terror attacks are randomly chosen targets or selective targets (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generator. Also, threat-and-violence based communication process between the terrorists, (imperilled) victims, and main target are used to manipulate the main target, turning into a target of demands, or a target of attention depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is properly used [12]. Another important point about terrorism was mentioned by [15] when he wrote that the act of terrorism can be employed by aggrieved person or persons irrespective of ideological persuasions to further a cause (just or unjust).

2.4 Theoretical Framework

The study adopts the structural-functional theoretical framework. The structure-functional approach was introduced by eminent political

scientists, Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell to the study of politics (comparative politics). They both postulated that to have a profound knowledge of how a political system works, it was necessary to avoid a narrow study and understanding of only institutions (or structures), but also their diverse functions.

According to [16] the structural functional approach explains the relationships that exist between the parts (structures) on the one hand and between the parts and whole (political system) on the other hand. Citing Emenu, [16] further affirmed that the approach emphasizes the role of and functions of the political structures and functions in understanding politics and political processes and the conditions under which such function could be fulfilled.

The structural-functional approach was based on the view that a political system is made up of several key components, and branches of government. In addition to structures, Almond and Powell showed that a political system consist of functions, such as political socialization, recruitment and communication. This goes to say that all political systems have parts and each part performs specific functions all of which contributes towards the functionality of the overall system. Hence, the non-performance of a specific function any of the structures may contribute in some ways to malfunction of the system as a whole [16].

Deducing from the above, the theory holds sway in the study as it concerns the entire political system of the Nigerian state. Thus, the Nigerian state is a system with the different sectors- agriculture, transportation, oil and gas, social service, education, health, manufacturing and defence cum security sector; each having it role to play to ensure equilibrium and effective service delivery for the overall national interest and survival. But a breakdown in any of the sectors is tantamount to serious system malfunctioning.

The defence sector remains very strategic and unique in terms of national survival. [17] emphasized on the imperative of defence sector when he opined that "reduced to fundamentals, the crux of defence policy is "the relation of force" to national purposes: the later involves basic values, the enhancement of which is often considered the high-priority goals of a state foreign policy. It follows, therefore that as an instrument of foreign policy, defence policy is

concerned with the provision, deployment, and the use of military power to facilitate the protection and promotion of perceived National interest of the state. Such “National interest” may concern “core” values, which are near constant and few in number, involving the survival of society and its population, political sovereignty, and territorial independence.”

Corruption in the Nigerian armed forces has made the fight against Boko Haram terrorism largely ineffective, and by extension, has made the State to be encapsulated by insecurity of lives and property, fear, and anxiety. There is no gain saying, that the Boko Haram insurgency is a serious “national threat issue” concerning security. However, it is affecting the economy, social and political lives of the entire gamut of the State. Hence, one cannot doubt the relevance of the armed forces in the maintenance of the unity and wellbeing of the country. Suffice here that as a structure (defence and security) forming part of the system (the Nigerian state), the breakdown of security, law and order in such magnitude as evident in the Boko Haram threats destabilizes the entire system. And the inability of the armed forces to effectively contain and stop the Boko Haram menace leads to other aspects of our national lives being severely affected. Also, to ensure the corporate existence of the Nigerian state is dependent on the viability and effectiveness of the armed forces of Nigeria in fighting enemies both within and outside the territory. This is sought for and sustained through the provision of inputs such as adequate funds, up-to-date military professional training especially in non-conventional warfare in line with international best practices, recruitment, mentoring, morale, arms and ammunitions, food, medicine, and other logistic needs injected into the sector.

3. BOKO HARAM TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

3.1 Origin of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

There have been conflicting views concerning the origin and rationale for the formation of Boko Haram. While some believe that the group is a recent creation which came into existence in 2002, others posit that the group has existed far back 1995 but only became popular around 2009 when it started to attack places of social and religious gathering, and other terrorist actions like kidnapping, bombing and killing of innocent

citizens of the country both Christians and Muslims, adults and children, and men and women.

The origin of the Boko Haram sect has being traced to Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization in 1995 with its founder as Lawan Abubakar [13]. According to this origin, the leader who left to study in University of Medina in Saudi Arabia was succeeded by a young and versatile Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. Mohammed Yusuf began as a preacher and leader in the youth wing, Shababul Islam (Islamic youth vanguard), of Al-Sunnah, a Salafi group [18]. Immediately Yusuf took over, he changed the doctrine of the sect and abandoned the cleric’s view and came up with extremist Boko Haram doctrine. Yusuf argued that Western education, or ‘Boko’, had brought nothing but poverty and suffering to the region and was therefore forbidden, or ‘Haram’ in Islam [19]. The group stands for the outright rejection of western education, western culture and modern science. It rather advocates the propagation of strict adherence to Islam in its purest form [15].

From 2002 to 2009, the group was led by Mohammed Yusuf in Borno State in the Northeastern region of Nigeria. His aim was to establish a Shari’a government in Borno state under former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff [20]. The sect believes the establishment of Islamic government would address the ills of society including corruption, and bad governance. On this note, Yusuf subsequently became increasingly critical of government and official corruption. His popularity soared, and the group expanded into other states, including Bauchi, Yobe and Kano [18]. It is alleged that by 2004, the sect leaders had established links with the Algerian Salafist Group now known as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which gave some of their members training in combat, weapons handling and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) [15]. In fact, the sect established a base called “Afghanistan” in Kanamma villages in Northern Yobe State.

The group became known internationally following riots that lasted from 25th July to 30th July 2009 and spread across the four states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno, the latter of which saw the most extensive rioting perhaps because it was the leader of the movement’s base [21]. With the effort of the Nigeria armed forces, the said leader of the sect (Mohammed Yusuf) was executed along with some of the

members of the sect. After the death of Yusuf, his followers went underground for a year before surfacing with attacks on police stations and military barracks to avenge the killings of Mohammed Yusuf and other members of the sect. The group also carried out jailbreaks to free members, and demanded prosecution of Yusuf's killers, release of its detained colleagues, restoration of its destroyed mosques, and compensation for members killed by the Nigerian troops [18].

Late Mohammed Yusuf was later succeeded by Abubakar Shekau who emerged as a new leader in July, 2010. As the head of the sect, he accentuated the movements' radicalization and extremism. With Shekau at the helm of its most significant faction, Boko Haram has grown more ruthless, violent and destructive and less open to dialogue [18]. The group may be willing to increase the tempo of its attacks and expansion of its perspective of a 'developed society' (vis-à-vis the adoption of the Shari'a) [5] owing to its adoption of the name "Wilayat Ghard Afriqiya", which when translated to English means, 'Islamic State West African Province', to show that it is a branch of the Islamic State (IS). The group's act of kidnapping 276 schoolchildren from their school in April 2014 brought the group, the little town of Chibok in Borno State, and particularly, the nature and extent of terrorism in Nigeria to the limelight. The incident was trending on the social media platforms. A trend was even created on Twitter, #BringBackOurGirls. This was followed by mass protests on an international scale by individuals, and groups to condemn the action and to call for a global effort to search for, rescue, and reunite the schoolchildren with their families. Also, a non-profit was created owing to this called the BringBackOurGirls (BBOG) campaign, and it championed many protests in Nigeria.

3.2 Factors that Precipitated the Rise of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria

To understand the factors that led to the rise of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, a firm grasp of the frustration-aggression theory and the relative deprivation theory is imperative. Frustration aggression theory is a theory of aggression proposed by John Dollard and Neal E. Miller in 1939, and was further developed by Roger Baker in 1941 and Leonard Berkowitz in 1963. The theory succinctly explains that frustration causes aggression, but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression

gets displaced into an innocent target. The theoretical framework provides explanation for violent behavioural disposition resulting from the inability of people to fulfil their human needs. This is based on the premise that all humans have needs which they seek to fulfil and that any blockade to the fulfilment of these needs by individuals or groups elicits violent response [22]. This further explains that frustration precipitated by factors such as severe poverty, unemployment, and elicits corruption, causes aggression. Within the affected masses, who, feeling alienated, frustrated and abandoned either found refuge in their religious groups, or manipulated to wage insurgence against the state [23].

The relevance of the theory to the insurgency of Boko Haram is better appreciated when viewed against the backdrop of widespread poverty in Northern part of Nigeria. Boko Haram has its roots fundamentally in poverty caused by bad governance in the North. The sect aims to carry out its aggression as a result of the frustration which is reflected in the raise of unemployed and uneducated street beggars popularly known as the Almajirai (Hausa plural for Almajiri) who have been abandoned by the governors and other elected leaders. In light of this, it is reported that bad governance, sustained economic hardship, raising inequality and social frustration are factors fostering the growth of radical extremist groups [24]. This implies that the tendency to produce suicide bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery and joblessness than the one in which basic needs such as food, education, health, housing and sanitation are met for the majority of the people [25]. The sect has demonstrated its aggression by mostly attacking Nigerian police and security forces, banks, churches, market places, and schools.

Also germane to the emergence of the Boko Haram sect is the relative deprivation theory which is closely related to the frustration aggression theory. This theory was articulated by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues—Edward Suchman, Leland DeVinney, Shirley Star, and Robin Williams—in their 1949 book, "*Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier*", while studying the social psychology of soldiers during the Second World War to explain series of unexpected relationships between feelings of satisfaction and status (based on comparison with others) and one's position in the army [26]. [27] referred to relative deprivation as

'the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and this disposes men to violence'. Gurr's definition explains the difference between what people ought to get or their value expectation and what they actually get. And so, they are likely to revolt when their expectations are not met. This is as a result of the fact that there are other persons who have what they are entitled to and they know getting what they want is realistic and this can only be gotten with the use of violence. This is also reflected in [28] four preconditions of relative deprivation (of object X by person A).

- ❖ Person A does not have X
- ❖ Person A knows of other persons who have X
- ❖ Person A wants to have X
- ❖ Person A believes obtaining X is realistic [28].

Deduced from the above, relative deprivation essentially means the feeling of being deprived of something one feels entitled to, which is related to the emergence of extremist sect in the Northern Nigeria who claim to fight for these entitlement. The extent of relative poverty and inequality in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria has led several scholars to argue that the rationale behind the Boko Haram violence is as a result of the socio-economic deprivation in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. [29] asserts that Boko Haram communities are wrecked by poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructures, educational backwardness, raising numbers of unemployed youth, dwindling fortune in agriculture and their weak productive base of the Northern economy. Supporting this, [21] stated that poverty and unemployment have therefore served recipe for the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency because this has left the hopeless poor people to be used as mercenary fighters. The discrepancy is a frustrating experience which in the long run results in either rebellion or revolution.

The measurement of relative deprivation is most apparent in the Northern region. A comparison between the Southeast and Southwest zones shows that the relative poverty rates are 67.0% and 59.1% respectively. While that of the Northeast and Northwest zones have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty [30]. Less than 23% of women and 54% of men in the North-East Nigeria can read compare to more than 79% of women and 90% of men in the

South [31]. Also, infrastructural development lags behind in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. For example, only 24% of household have access to electricity, compared to the 71% of households in the Southwest [31]. The rise or increase in the rate of poverty and unemployment in the Northeastern part of Nigeria has led many to be used as instrument in the execution of the sect's activities. On this note, [32] opined that public sector corruption leading to misuse of resources, unemployment and mass poverty, ignorance due to limited educational opportunities swelled the army of vulnerable people whose disillusionment and impoverishment made them easy prey in the hands of demagogues like the late Yusuf.

Another factor is the spate of police brutality and suppression of the Boko Haram sect and its members. Prior to July 2009, the sect began its acts of violence and terrorism against the Nigerian State in late 2003 when it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State, and Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State. However, the Islamic group became more daring in July 2009 when it had a faceoff with the Nigerian security forces in an anti-government uprising. It is alleged that the uprising was a result of the Nigerian security forces' fatal shooting of June 11, 2009 at the sect members in which thirteen of them were shot. In retaliation, Boko Haram members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station on July 26. The attack sparked off a wave of unrest which swept through Kano, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Katsina States between 26th and 30th July, 2009. This uprising claimed the lives of more than 500 people (the Boko Haram sect having a larger share of fatalities) [33]. [33] explained that the fighting ended on July 30 when Mohammed Yusuf was captured at his residence in Maiduguri (and some other members of the sect were arrested), and was brutally killed in what looked like an extra-judicial killing only after a few hours in police custody; although the police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape.

Angered over the death of its leader and coupled with the other loses the Boko Haram sect sustained during the short-lived uprising, it receded from vehemently attacking the Nigerian State for over a year only to rejuvenate by seeking the recruitment of new members, radicalizing its members, orchestrating a massive jailbreak in 2010, and resurging in 2011; this time hotter, blood-thirsty, and a lot more composed,

and with sophisticated training, weaponry, and tactics like villages and towns raids, suicide bombings, arson, targeted assassinations, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and night-vision goggles, open gun battles with the armed forces as well as attacks on military bases and other places of socioeconomic and political importance. The sect staged its first suicide bombing attack in Nigeria on 16 June 2011, (hence forth referred to as the 16/6 bombing). [33] stresses this view further as he submit that since the July 2009, and more especially after the September 2010 jailbreak, the sect evolved from a group that waged poorly planned open confirmation with the securities forces to one that launches attacks that are

“...more coordinated and sophisticated, and are authorized by an 18-member Shura, led by its new spiritual leader, Imam Abubakar Shekau. Attacks have focused largely on state security forces – police, soldiers, civil defence, and prison wardens, among others – and to a lesser extent on centres of worship, community and religious leaders, politicians, and other civilians who they consider as ‘enemies’. However, the attack

on the United Nations building at Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja, on 26 August 2011 marked a departure from Boko Haram’s traditional target set of government facilities and indeed signposts the possibility of a change in target selection in the future” [33].

3.3 Timelines of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

The Boko Haram sect has been terrorizing Nigeria with violent attacks for more than eight years now; the sect accounting for over 20,000 deaths and the displacement of over 1.3 million denizens of the Northeastern region of Nigeria from their homes. Despite the government’s and military’s efforts at ending the insurgency especially in the Northeast, the terrorists have not stopped their attacks – through raids, suicide bombings, and arson – picking up soft targets in markets, churches, mosques, and residential areas in the Northeastern States, and in Nigeria’s neighbours, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

The table below shows the timelines of some of Boko Haram’s acts of terrorism on the Nigerian state in its aim to push its course between 2009 and 2017.

Table 1. Timeline of some of Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria between 2009 and 2017

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
1.	July 27, 2009	Yobe State	Attack on Postiskum, Yobe State Divisional police Headquarters.	Three Policemen and one fire service officer died.
2.	September 8, 2010	Bauchi State	Bauchi Central Prison was set ablazed and members of the sect freed	Killed 5 people
3.	March 13, 2010	Plateau State	Operation in Northern part of Jose Plateau State	Led to the death of 300 people.
4.	October 1, 2010	Abuja	Explosion near Eagle Square, Abuja	Claimed 12 lives, leaving many injured.
5.	December 24, 2010	Plateau State	A bomb attack, in Barkin Ladin, Jos, Plateau State	Killed 8 people
6.	December 31, 2010	Abuja	Explosion at Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja	Killed 10 people
7.	March, 2011	Kaduna State	Attack then residence of Divisional Police Officer at Rigasa area of Kaduna State	Killed two policemen
8.	March 30, 2011	Yobe State	Planted a bomb in Damaturu, Yobe State.	Killed a police officer.
9.	April 8, 2011	Niger State	Bomb at INEC office in Suleja, Niger.	Killed eight corps member and the suicide bomber.
10.	April 9 th , 2011	Borno State	Bomb explosion occurred at a polling unit in Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri, Borno State.	Killed the suicide bomber
11.	May 29 th , 2011	Bauchi	Explosion at mammy market of	Claimed lives and left

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
		State	shandawanka barracks in Bauchi State.	many injured
12.	May 30 th , 2011	Borno State	Bomb exploded early morning in Maiduguri, Borno State	Killed 13 and injured 40.
13.	June 7 th , 2011	Borno State	series of bomb blasts occurred in Maiduguri, Borno State	Killed 5 and several people injured.
14.	June 16 th , 2011	Abuja	Bombed Nigeria police headquarters, Abuja	Killed 3 and many vehicle damaged.
15.	June 16 th , 2011	Borno State	Bomb blast at Damboa town, Maiduguri.	Killed 4.
16.	June 20 th , 2011	Kastina State	Attacked Kankara police station in Kastina State	Killed seven policemen and two security men.
17.	July 9 th , 2011	Borno State	A clash between Boko Haram and the military	Killed 31 people
18.	July 9 th , 2011	Niger State	A bomb targeted at a church in Suleja, Niger State	Killed 4 and injured many others
19.	July 12 th , 2011	Borno State	Boko Haram throw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle	Claimed 5 lives
20.	July 15 th , 2011	Borno State	Explosion in Maiduguri	injured 5 people
21.	July 23 rd , 2011	Borno State	An explosion close to the palace of traditional ruler in Maiduguri	Claimed 8 lives
22.	August 26 th , 2011	Abuja	A suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building in Abuja	Killed 25 and injured 60
23.	September 12 th , 2011	Bauchi State	Bomb blast in a police station in Misau, Bauchi	killed 7 people including 4 policemen
24.	September 13 th , 2011	Borno State	Attacked soldiers shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members during military raids on Boko Haram hideout	Injured 4 soldiers.
25.	October 3 rd , 2011	Borno State	Attacked Baga market in Maiduguri	Killed 3 people
26.	November 4 th , 2011	Yobe State	Attacked Damaturu the state capital	About 15 people killed.
27.	November 27 th , 2011	Yobe State	Attacked Geidam	Killed 7 people
28.	December 22 nd , 2011	Borno State	Explosion and gunshots	Killed 4 and left several people injured
29.	December 24 th , 2011	Plateau State	Bomb blast	Killed about 180 people
30.	December 25 th , 2011	Niger State	Christmas Day bomb blast in Madalla, Niger State	Killed about 150 people
31.	December 30 th , 2011	Borno State	Attacked Maiduguri the state capital	Killed 7 people
32.	January 5 th , 2012	Gombe State	Attacked a church	Killed 6 people
33.	January 6 th , 2012	Adama wa State	Attacked Christ Apostolic Church and Mubi, Adamawa	Killed 17 people and 20 igbo people in Mubi.
34.	January 20 th , 2012	Kano State	Multiple attacks in Kano	Killed about 250 people
35.	January 22 nd , 2012	Bauchi State	Attacks at two churches and the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi State	Killed about 10 people
36.	January 26 th ,	Kano	Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari,	Several people were

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
	2012	State	Kano State	injured
37.	January 28 th , 2012	Borno State	Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno State	1 killed
38.	January 30 th , 2012	Borno State	attack in Maiduguri the state capital	Killed 6 including 2 air force officers
39.	February 4 th , 2012	Borno State	Attack in Damboa town, Borno State	Killed 2
40.	February 7 th , 2012	Kaduna State	Attacked military barracks	5 killed
41.	February 10 th , 2012	Kano State	Book Haram sect attacked police station in Shagari Quarters	Killed several people
42.	February 15 th , 2012	Kogi State	Jail break in Koton Karji prison, Kogi State, and freed 199 prisoners	A wader killed
43.	February 19 th , 2012	Niger State	Bomb blast in Suleja, Niger State, near Christ Embassy church	5 people injured
44.	February 26 th , 2012	Plateau State	Bombing of Church of Christ in Nigeria	Killed about 2 worshippers and several people injured.
45.	March 8 th , 2012		Abduction of Italian, Franco Lamolinara and a Briton, Christopher McManus	Killed the 2 foreigners
46.	March 11 th , 2012	Plateau State	Bomb blast in St. Finberr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos	Killed 11 people and several others injured
47.	April 26 th , 2012	Abuja	Bombed three media houses (This Day Newspaper) in Abuja	Killed 5 people including 2 security officers and left 13 people injured
48.	April 30 th , 2012	Jalingo	Bomb explosion in Jalingo	Killing 11 and several others injured
49.	June 3 rd , 2012	Bauchi State	Bomb blast in church	Killed 15 and left several others injured
50.	June 17 th , 2012	Kaduna State	Suicide bombing in churches.	Killed at least 50 people
51.	3 rd October, 2012	Adama wa State	Massacred people in the town of Mubi	Killed about 25-46 people
52.	January 4 th , 2013	Ogun State	Ogun prison break. Freed 15 inmates	
53.	March 18 th , 2013	Kano State	Bus bomb blast	Killed about 65 people
54.	April 16 th , 2013	Bonue State	Bega Massacre	Killed 187 people
55.	June 9 th , 2013	Yobe State	Attacked students and teachers in Damaturu	Killed 13 people
56.	July 6 th , 2013	Yobe State	Book Haram gun men attacked a school	Killed more than 42 people
57.	September 12 th , 2013	Borno	Armbush of soldiers by Boko Haram	Killed 40 soldiers
58.	September 29 th , 2013	Yobe State	A massacre in Gujba College	Killed more than 50 students
59.	October 10 th , 2013	Borno State	An attack in Damboa	Killed 20 (15 suspected militants and 5 civilians)
60.	October 29 th , 2013	Yobe State	Attacked Damaturu, the state capital	Killed at least 128 people
61.	January 14 th ,	Borno	The sect bombed bombed	Killed 74 and injured 54

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
62.	2014 February 16 th , 2014	State Borno State	Maiduguri Massacre in Izghe village	people Killed 105 people
63.	February 24 th , 2014	Yobe State	Mass murder of college students	Killed 43 people
64.	February 27 th , 2014	Borno State	Armed attack	Killed 74 and injured 54 people
65.	March 2 nd , 2014	Borno State	Bomb blast in Maiduguri	Killed 300 and left 250 people injured
66.	April 14 th , 2014	Abuja	Twin bomb blast attack	Killed over 88 people
67.	April 15 th , 2014	Borno State	Abduction of 276 Chibok school girls	
68.	May 1 st , 2014	Abuja	A car bomb blast	Killed 19 people
69.	May 5 th , 2014	Borno state	Attacked Gamboru and Ngala towns	Killed 300 people
70.	May 20 th , 2014	Plateau State	Car bomb blast in jos	Killed 118
71.	May 27 th , 2014	Yobe State	Buni Yadi attack	Killed 49 security personnel and 9 civilians
72.	June 1 st , 2014	Adama wa State	Bomb blast at Mubi	Killed at least 40 people
73.	June 2 nd , 2014	Borno State	Gwoza massacre killing mostly Christians	Killed 200
74.	June 28 th , 2014	Bauchi State	Bomb blast	Killed 11 people
75.	July 18 th , 2014	Adama wa State	Boko Haram attack in Damboa	Killed 18
76.	September 19 th , 2014	Borno State	Attack at a busy market in Mainok	Killed about 30 people
77.	October 31 st , 2014	Gombe State	Explosion at a bus station	Killed at least 4 people and left 32 injured
78.	November 2 nd , 2014	Kogi State	Prison break which led to the freeing of 99 inmates	
79.	November 3 rd - 10 th , 2014	Yobe State	Double suicide bombing	Killed 61 people
80.	November 25 th , 2014	Borno State	Suicide bomb blast in Maiduguri	Killed over 45 people
81.	November 28 th , 2014	Kano State	Bomb blast	Killed at least 120 Muslims
82.	December 1 st - 5 th , 2014	Borno State	Suicide bombers detonated explosion at a market place in Maiduguri	Killed several people
83.	December 10 th , 2014	Kano State	Suicide bombing near a market.	Killed at least 4 people and injured 7
84.	December 11 th , 2014	Borno State	Massacre and destruction of houses in Gajiganna	Killed 30
85.	December 13 th , 2014	Borno State	Abduction of people in Gumsuri	Killed about 35 people
86.	December 22 nd , 2014	Gombe State	Bus station bomb blast	Killed at least 27 people
87.	January 3 rd 7th, 2015	Borno State	Boko Haram razed the entire town of Baga and controls 70 percent of Borno State	Killed at least 2000 people
88.	January 10 th ,	Borno	Female suicide bomb blast at a	The suicide bomber and

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
89.	2015 January 24 th , 2015	State Borno State	market in Maiduguri Book Haram gunmen attempt to burn down the village of Kambari near Maiduguri	19 others Killed 15 people
90.	January 28 th , 2015	Adama wa State	Book Haram went on rampage	Killed 40
91.	February 1 st , 2015	Gombe State	Suicide bomb blast outside a mosque	Killed 5
92.	February 2 nd , 2015	Gombe State	Suicide bomb blast after the president of Nigeria leave an election rally in the city of Gombe	Killed 1 and left 18 injured.
93.	February 12 th , 2015	Borno State	Book Haram raided Mbuta Town.	Killed 8
94.	February 15 th , 2015	Yobe State	Suicide bomb blast in Damaturu	Killed 16 and left 30 injured
95.	February 24 th , 2015	Yobe State	Suicide bomb blast at bus station in Potiskum	Killed at least 27
96.	February 28 th , 2015	Yobe State	Suicide bomb blast near Damaturu	Killed 4 civilians
97.	March 7 th , 2015	Borno State	Five suicide bomb blast in Maiduguri	Killed 54 and left 143 injured.
98.	March 28 th , 2015	Gombe state	Gunmen opened fire at voters in Dukku in Gombe	Killed at least 15 people.
99.	April 5 th , 2015	Borno state	Boko Haram militants dressed as preachers raided Kwafaja Village.	Killed at least 24 people.
100.	April 9 th , 2015	Borno state	Members of Boko Haram raided the village of Dile	Killed at least 20 people.
101.	April 17 th , 2015.	Borno State	Militants entered the town of Gwoza and slit the throats of at least 12 townspeople	Killed at least 12 people.
102.	June 22 nd , 2015	Borno state	Two suicide bombs at a Mosque in Maiduguri.	Killed at least 30 people.
103.	July 1 st , 2015	Borno state	Boko Haram militants attacked a mosque in Kukawa.	Killed at least 48 men and boys, and 17 others injured.
104.	July 6 th , 2015.	Plateau state	Two bomb attacks on the central Nigerian city of Jos	Killed at least 44 people.
105.	July 22 nd , 2015	Borno state	Gunmen raided a village, Pompomari, near Maiduguri.	Killed at least 8 people.
106.	July 26 th , 2015.	Yobe State	A girl, aged about 10, carried out a suicide bombing near a crowded market in Damaturu	Killed at least 16 people.
107.	August 1 st , 2015	Borno state	Boko Haram fighters attacked Malari village, near Maiduguri.	Killed at least 13 people.
108.	August 24 th , 2015	Yobe State	A child bomber detonates a bomb outside a bus station in Damaturu	Killed at least 6 people and wounded dozens.
109.	September 20 th , 2015	Borno state	Three bomb explosions in Maiduguri.	Killed at least 54 people.
110.	September 27 th , 2015	Borno State	Boko Haram members attacked Mailari village of Konduga Local Government Authority (LGA).	Killed at least 9 people and several others injured.
111.	November 17 th , 2015.	Adama wa state	A blast in the northeastern Nigerian city of Yola on Tuesday night tore through a marketplace.	Killed at least 32 people and about 80 others injured.
112.	November 27 th ,	Kano	Suicide bombing on a procession	Killed at least 22 people

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
	2015	state	of hundreds of Shiite Muslims in Dakasoye, Kano	and about 38 others injured.
113.	December 10, 2015	Borno state.	Boko Haram members raided and razed Kamuya village, which is located along the border between Borno and Yobe State.	Killed at least 14 people.
114.	January 6 th , 2016.	Borno state.	Boko Haram gunmen raided Izageki village in northern Nigeria, close to Sambisa Forest.	Killed at least 7 people
115.	January 29 th , 2016.	Adama wa state	A 12-year-old blew himself up in the Gombis' market, Gombi	Killed at least 11 people
116.	February 1 st , 2016	Borno state	Militants attacked Dalori village, Nigeria with suicide bombs and allegedly burned children alive.	Killed at least 86 people
117.	February 9 th , 2016	Borno state	Two female suicide bombers detonated explosives at a displaced persons camp in Dikwa	Killed at least 58 people and about 80 others injured.
118.	March 16 th , 2016	Borno state	Three female suicide bombers attacked Umarari Village, on the outskirts of Maiduguri.	Killed at least 22 people about 18 others injured.
119.	March 26 th , 2016	Borno state	Boko Haram raided the remote village of Tumpun near Lassa in Askiru/Uba LGA	Killed at least 4 people
120.	April 24 th , 2016	Borno state	Boko Haram raided Alau village	Killed at least 30 people
121.	May 12 th , 2016	Borno state	Suicide bomb attack in Maiduguri	Killed at least 6 people including a police officer
122.	May 29 th , 2016	Borno state	In Biu, a tricycle taxi triggered an old IED	Killed at least 6 people including a soldier and 6 others injured
123.	June 17 th , 2016	Plateau State	Boko Haram militants attacked a funeral in Kuda	Killed at least 24 people and 10 others injured
124.	June 20 th , 2016	Borno state	Boko Haram attacked Wumbi	Killed at least 2 people
125.	July 8 th , 2016	Borno state	Suicide bomb attack on a mosque in Borno	Killed at least 9 people
126.	August 20 th , 2016	Borno state	Boko Haram raided Kuruburu village with machine guns	Killed at least 7 people
127.	August 21 st , 2016	Borno state	Militants attacked Kuburwva village	Killed at least 11 people and raping women
128.	September 25 th , 2016	Kaduna state	Boko Haram militants attacked soliers and civilian JTF member in Borno towns of Miyanti and Dareljamal	Killed at least 4 people
129.	October 12 th , 2016	Borno state	Bomb explosion in Maiduguri	Killed at least 18 people
130.	October 29 th , 2016	Borno state	Two suicide bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Killed at least 8 people
131.	November 1 st , 2016	Borno state	Car bomb explosion near a military checkpoint in Gubio	Killed at least 11 people
132.	November 2 nd , 2016	Borno state	Gun-battle between Boko Haram militants and the Nigerian army	Killed at least 7 soldiers including an army officer
133.	November 8 th , 2016	Borno state	Two suicide bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Killed at least 4 people and 6 others injured
134.	November 11 th , 2016	Borno state	Early morning bomb blast in the Umulari area of Maiduguri	Killed at least 2 people

S/N	Date of attack	State	Nature of attack and location	Casualties
135.	November 18 th , 2016	Borno state	Multiple bomb blast in Maiduguri	Killed at least 6 people
136.	November 23 rd , 2016	Borno state	Suicide bomb attack in Maiduguri	Killed at least 24 people and 10 others injured
137.	December 9 th , 2016	Adama wa state	Two explosions in Madagali LGA	Killed at least 57 people and 177 others injured
138.	December 11 th , 2016	Borno state	Two suicide bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Killed at least 3 people
139.	January 7 th , 2017	Yobe state	Boko Haram attacked a Nigerian army base in Buni Yadi	Killed at least 5 soldiers
140.	January 10 th , 2017	Borno state	Two suicide bomb attacks in Kalari town	Killed at least 4 people
141.	January 13 th , 2017	Borno state	Gun-battle between Boko Haram militants and the Nigerian army in Kangarwa	Killed at least 3 soldiers and 27 others injured
142.	January 16 th , 2017	Borno state	Two suicide bomb attacks in Nigeria's University of Maiduguri	Killed at least 3 people including a professor
143.	January 25 th , 2017	Borno state	A suicide bomb attacks	Killed at least 3 people and 2 others injured
144.	February 11 th , 2017	Borno state	Boko Haram ambushed soldiers of the Nigerian army	Killed at least 7 soldiers and 19 others injured
145.	February 13 th , 2017	Borno state	Boko Haram invaded Mifa Community in Chibok	Killed an Islamic scholar and broke the hands of a boy
146.	May 5 th , 2017	Borno state	Two suicide bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Killed at least 5 people
147.	May 15 th , 2017	Borno state	Nine Boko Haram militants attacked farmers in Amarwa	Killed at least 11 farmers with machetes
148.	May 20 th , 2017	Borno state	Gunshots in separate attacks by Boko Haram militants	Killed at least 7 people and 40 others injured
149.	June 8 th , 2017	Borno state	Multiple suicide bomb attacks targeting mosques in Maiduguri	Killed at least 14 people and 24 others injured
150.	June 10 th , 2017	Borno state	Boko Haram raided the village of Hambagba near Gwoza, on the Cameroon border	Killed at least 4 people and kidnapped 6 others
151.	June 14 th , 2017	Borno state	Boko Haram raided the village of Komdi and Tuyan	Killed at least 10 people and kidnapped 6 others
152.	June 18 th , 2017	Borno state	Multiple suicide bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Killed at least 12 people and 11 others injured
153.	June 26 th , 2017	Borno state	Multiple suicide bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Killed at least 9 people and 13 others injured

Source: Vanguard (December 11, 2015) [34]; Oropo (December 13, 2015) [35]; Stanford University (August 26, 2016) [36]; Anyadike (January 20, 2012) [37]; Authors' compilations

4. CORRUPTION AS A CHALLENGE TO THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM TERRORISM

It is worth reiterating that corruption is inimical to development. Anywhere corruption is found there is bound to be hiccups in the process of administering fair, just, impartial, and effective duties and services. The same can be said of the Nigerian armed forces whose internal dynamics are been eaten up by the gangrenous cancer,

corruption. This has caused the armed forces to experience decline which creates instability in the military and in the nation's security. The extent at which corruption is crippling the Nigerian military is gaining increasing interests from all quarters. For instance, [38] averred that there are a number of factors that have combined to undermine the government's ability to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the most prominent being corruption. For them corruption is not a strange phenomenon in Nigeria, and in the fight against insurgency its

manifestation has been expressed through malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance. These three concepts mean,

“Malfeasance is more than stealing; it is the performance by public officers of deeds that they are forbidden to perform by constitutional or statutory law or by commonly accepted moral standard... Misfeasance is the improper performance of lawful duties, it involves administrative activity that is within the lawful mission of an agency but violates constitutional standards or public interests. Nonfeasance is the failure of public officers to perform required duties” [38].

As reported by [39], the United States under the Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, Sarah Sewall, said categorically that corruption is hindering Nigeria’s efforts at ending insurgency in the Northeast. How? The first case is the theft of funds appropriated to the defence sector for combating terrorism in Nigeria. [40] in a bid to address the escalated terrorism increased the defence budget from 100 billion naira (\$625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion naira (\$6 billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion (\$6.25 billion) naira in 2012, 2013, and 2014.

The Table 2 shows the defence allocation of the Nigerian government between 2007 and 2015.

Despite the huge allocations to the Nigerian defence sector, there is no corresponding outcome due to the inability of the military to justifiably expend the appropriations in tackling security problems in the country. Little wonder [49] stated that it can be argued that there is no correlation between the amounts of money budgeted for the defence sector and the outcome of transformation in the sector. To that extent, therefore, [38] wrote that a thorough investigation about how the monies are spent will reveal that a large sum of the monies budgeted for combating insurgency have been misappropriated by top government, military and other security agencies’ officials in collaboration with politicians and contractors supplying military hardware. As [5] wrote, a case in point is the \$2.1 million Arms Deal Scandal popularly called the Dasukigate; involving the former National Security Adviser (NSA), (Rtd.) Col. Sambo Dasuki and other top military officers and politicians. The case revealed the large-scale fraud in the armed forces where funds meant for the military were been distributed for private and partisan purposes. The kleptocratic capture of the Nigerian defence sector has seen over \$15billion

Table 2. Budgetary allocations of the Nigerian security/defence sector from 2007 and 2016

S/N	Year	Total budget (Naira)	Security/defence allocations (Naira)	Percentage (%)	Administration
1	2007	2.3 trillion naira	213 billion naira	9.26%	Olusegun Obasanjo/Umar Yar'Adua.
2	2008	2.45 trillion naira	444.6 billion naira	18.15%	Umar Yar' Adua
3	2009	3.049 trillion naira	176.2 billion naira	5.78%	Umar Yar' Adua
4	2010	4.6 trillion naira	264 billion naira	5.74%	Umar Yar' Adua
5	2011	4.97 trillion naira	380 billion naira	7.65%	Goodluck Jonathan
6	2012	4.88 trillion naira	359.7 billion naira	7.37%	Goodluck Jonathan
7	2013	4.99 trillion naira	950 billion naira	19.04%	Goodluck Jonathan
8	2014	4.962 trillion naira	968.13 billion naira	19.51%	Goodluck Jonathan
9	2015	4.59 trillion naira	388.8 billion naira	8.47%	Goodluck Jonathan/ Muhammadu Buhari
10	2016	6.06 trillion naira	294.5 billion naira	4.86%	Muhammadu Buhari

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) [41]; Nigerian Muse (November 8, 2007) [42]; Nigerian Eye (March 17, 2011) [43]; Breaking Times (April 29, 2015) [44]; Udo (May 24, 2014) [45]; Guardian (December 18, 2008) [46]; Premium Times (March 8, 2013) [47]; Umoru & Shaibu (March 16, 2012) [48].

stolen, leaving the military without vital equipment, insufficiently trained, low in morale and under resourced. This has crippled the Nigerian military in fighting an aggressive ideologically inspired enemy, such as Boko Haram [4].

Another way corruption challenges the military's war against Boko Haram terrorism is the limitedness or unavailability of logistical support for the military. The components of logistics in its most comprehensive sense are those aspects of the military that deal with: the acquisition and distribution of military equipment (like arms and ammunition, fuel, weapons systems, etc); transport of personnel and equipment; construction and maintenance of facilities (like training camps, command centres, military bases, garrisons, etc); acquisition and furnishing of services (like uniforms, jungle boots, belts, entertainment, etc); and medical services (like food, water, and medicine) [50,51,52]. Regardless of the huge defence budgets, there are reports that the Nigerian military is ill-equipped, and that soldiers are usually sent into combat with limited weaponry. In a study by [53] he explained that some soldiers in Mubi and Izghe military bases, Adamawa State, stated that they use limited and very poor weaponry against well armed insurgents. The soldiers said that while they were equipped with just AK-47 rifles and only dozens of bullets, the insurgents use sophisticated arms and ammunition like Browning Machine Guns, rocket propelled grenades, night vision goggles, AK-49 rifles, armoured personnel carriers, and suchlike. Added to this is the fact that soldiers are poorly fed, medical services are limited or worse, unavailable, and families of fallen soldiers are only granted minimal stipends. These alone can completely demoralize the soldiers and hamper on the fight against terrorism.

More so, the level of secrecy inherent in the defence procurement pattern paves way for corruption. The public is made not to meddle into a candid scrutiny and publicization of defence matters. Thus, the absence of disclosure effectively makes the security sector the most prone to contract inflation and ineffective service delivery as well as the creation and financing of fake defence contracts. [54] citing Transparency International's news report, 'Weaponising transparency', noted that "corrupt military officials have been able to benefit from the conflict through the creation of fake defence contracts, the proceeds of which are often laundered

abroad in the United Kingdom (UK), United States (U.S.) and elsewhere." Similarly too is what [38] saw as good arena for corruption – military hardware contracts. For them, this is facilitated through the "offset" principle operated in defence procurement that is built into contractual conditionalities. Defence offset dictates that the buyer of the military hardware obliges to reinvest a percentage of the contract in the supplying company's home country. Since defence contracts involve great expenditure, the offset arrangement is similarly large in value, since (in many countries) there is almost no due diligence on potential improper check on beneficiaries from the offsets, and no monitoring of performance on offset contracts, thus, it is highly susceptible to corruption [38]. The suspicious way the Nigerian government smuggled an alleged sum of \$9.3 million to South Africa for military hardware purchase to confront the Boko Haram terrorism, and the failed attempt to probe this in the House of Representatives only explains the role corruption by the government and the armed forces' Chiefs have played in challenging the efforts to combat terrorism in Nigeria [38].

Corruption has also caused the Nigerian state to be handicapped in its fight against Boko Haram terrorism in the case of the purchase of substandard military material. In a statement issued in 2016 by the Senior Assistant to the Minister of Information and Culture, Segun Adeyemi, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, insisted that the weapons, munition and equipment which the former President said he bought were refurbished and lacked the basic components and spare parts. Additionally, that the ammunition bought for both high calibre and small weapons were mostly expired, incompatible with weapons and grossly inadequate [55]. This kind of situation of only leads to the injury and deaths of the soldiers who use the substandard equipment. It is worth noting here, as [56] wrote, following the fatal crash of Group Captain Ubong Akpan and Master Warrant Officer Zabesan Hosea, who boarded a Russian-made Mi-24V helicopter with the intent to carry-out assault on Boko Haram terrorists in Adamawa state in December 2014, the arm procurement audit, which began in August 2015, revealed that Air Vice Marshall Amosu and (Rtd) Col. Sambo Dasuki, purchased two unserviceable Mi-24V helicopters which were missing the necessary parts to fly, including being without rotors. Also, the audit showed that Col. Dasuki and other defence Chiefs purchased

unserviceable and cheaper military equipment when they had budgeted for newer military hardware. They then diverted the left-over funds to their personal accounts [5].

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The security, unity, and development of Nigeria have a large extent been threatened as a result of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect. The ideology and the various acts of terror perpetrated by the Islamic group on the nation and its citizenry are leading to a disintegrated Nigeria. Now, people particularly those in the Northeast live in fear and anxiety, and are suspicious of themselves. The armed forces whose primary purpose is to protect the nation and its citizens against internal and external enemies have been largely besieged by corruption which undermines the anti-terrorism war in Nigeria. Military funds are aggrandized for personal use, substandard military hardware are purchased, fake defence contracts are financed, soldiers on the frontline are armed with inferior weaponry and limited rounds of ammunition, poorly fed and remunerated, and lack basic medical services all because someone somewhere has siphoned the monies appropriated to meet the nation's need of restoring peace and security. Consequently, with the upsurge of Boko Haram terrorism and the inability of the military to curb the activities of the sect, the Nigerian state may decline to what Thomas Hobbes called "the State of Nature"; a state of untameable insecurity, lawlessness, and brutal killings.

Unless the Nigerian government addresses the issue of corruption and effectively tackles with concrete remedial actions the factors which have bred aggression of the sect, national peace and security in Nigeria will only be themes read in history books because the sect will continue to destabilize the Northeastern region of Nigeria and its attacks would eventually spread to other parts of the country. Therefore, the following recommendations will help to reduce corruption in the Nigerian armed forces and curb the activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria as means to sustain its national security and integration.

1. In order to eliminate or reduce the rate of corruption in Nigeria and the armed forces, the Federal government should strengthen the already established anti-graft

institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) which have been set up to fight against corruption in Nigeria.

2. The government and the top echelon of the Nigeria armed forces need to ensure transparency in the utilization of defence allocations, and the diligent review and monitoring of defence contracts and the performance of offsets arrangements in these contracts so that it will not serve as an avenue for corrupt transactions.
3. The government should address the issue of poverty and unemployment in the Northern part of Nigeria. This can be done by introducing socio-economic empowerment programs which would create jobs for the jobless youths who are prone to be very sympathetic to the sect's ideals and used as tools by the sect to carry out attacks.
4. There is the need for the prompt provision of adequate military logistics and sophisticated arms and ammunition for the soldiers on the frontline.
5. The Nigeria security agencies should be modernized by training their personnel in unconventional warfare in order to avoid extra-judicial killings and other forms of human right abuse of the sect's members and other innocent Nigerians.
6. There should be reforms in the educational and infrastructural sectors especially in the Northern part of Nigeria. The building of schools and making them free will pave way for the poor Almajirai to be educated, and the government needs to consolidate these efforts by incorporating the Almajiri system of education within the ministry of education and it should be supported by the Federal and State governments.
7. The Federal government should find those responsible for sponsoring the movement of the sect and make them face prosecution as cutting the sect's source of income would make it almost impossible for them to purchase sophisticated weapons to carry out further attacks.
8. As security personnel cannot carry out the investigation of, and fight against, the Boko Haram sect alone, it needs the cooperation of Nigerians who should help with relevant information by exposing anyone perpetuating crimes and having connections with any members of the sect.

- This will to a large extent help in unveiling the members of the sect.
9. There is the need for religious leaders - Priest, Pastors, Imams, Rabbis, etc., to be cautious of what they teach their followers and to encourage them to be good, peace-loving and law abiding citizens
 10. Nigerian government should continue to collaborate with external states such as the United States of America and United Kingdom as well as other governments bedevilled by terrorism as information sharing, intelligence and lessons learnt from them would be of help.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

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